
D Kennedy School

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About the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston

The Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government strives to improve the region's governance by attracting young people to serve the region, working with scholars to produce new ideas about important issues, and stimulating informed discussions that bring together scholars, policymakers, and civic leaders. The Rappaport Institute was founded and funded by the Phyllis and Jerome Lyle Rappaport Foundation, which promotes emerging leaders in Greater Boston.

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I: Introduction

What do parents value in their children's schools? Under the current assignment process, Boston's families rank schools, and these rankings provide us with a means of assessing the schools that parents like best.

As part of the 2012-13 process of reforming the Boston Public Schools' ("BPS") student assignment process, BPS has released a vast amount of data around the choices made in this process and school characteristics. Previously, the demand data was limited and information about the relationship of demand and school characteristics was largely anecdotal. Using this data, we examine the correlations between school characteristics and parental preferences. We ask what school attributes are particularly associated with parents ranking the schools highly in their choice sets.

We focus on parental preferences at kindergarten, grade six and grade nine, which are the gateway years for elementary school, middle school and high school respectively.

among their top three high schools, but that is not enough to Þll the school's ample classrooms. As such, this high level of demand does not imply that Boston should be building allocating more resources to vocational training.

There is also a connection between the racial makeup of the neighborhood and the popularity of nearby schools. Schools close to Asian and white populations are typically more popular. Again, this suggests that moving towards a more neighborhood based school model would effectively redistribute towards these populations.

These correlations are somewhat interesting, as they do suggest the popularity of schools inhabited by students of different ethnic groups, but they do not necessarily imply that parents are valuing the ethnicity of the student population. In most cases, it seems as likely to re

given to those applicants with sibling preference only. Sibling preference guarantees a spot at a school only up to the number of available seats. The level of seats Þlled by siblings is not provided by BPS, except in 2005[3].

Remaining seats up to a threshold of 50% of available seats are then granted to those with walk zone preference, in order of their random number. Following that, any remaining seats are allocated on the basis of random numbers.

For many applicants, they will not receive their Þrst choice (or several choices). If their numbers are high enough, they may be placed on a waiting list for some of the schools they had ranked higher but failed to receive a seat.

In 2004, a Task Force was convened to examine reforms to the school assignment process. It recommended a six zone option which was not implemented by the School Committee. The only major change in the process at this point was the substitution of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism for the “Boston Mechanism”. The details and ramiÞcations of this change are discussed below in the literature review.

In 2009, Superintendent Johnson presented a Þve zone plan to change the student assignment process but it was withdrawn several months after its launch.

In the Mayor’s State of the City address in January 2012, Mayor Menino pledged reforms to the school assignment process. BPS presented Þve reform options publicly and collected public comment on the proposed plans. The Mayor appointed a 24 member External Advisory Committee on School Choice (“EAC”). The EAC held a number of public hearings and had BPS make signiÞcant alterations to their initial plans.

The EAC settled on three potential plans, a 10 zone plan (later amended to 11) and

ntheld 1.8

Home-Based A and Home-Based B). The two algorithm-based plans were developed by MIT graduate student Peng Shi, as iterations on his previous work. A majority of the EAC voted in support of Home-Based A, which was forwarded (with a variety of other recommendations regarding the assignment process) to the Boston School Committee ("BSC").

On March 13, 2012, the BSC approved the adoption of the Home-Based A plan, while also dropping the walk zone preference.

choice mechanism has more school-speciÞc variables (as opposed to Boston's where priorities are set centrally and apply across all schools). Recent work has questioned the impact of these school speciÞc priorities on efÞciency[9]. A revisionist approach to the issue argues that the Boston Mechanism is being unfairly judged and may provide greater welfare in certain cases[10].

Theoretical reÞnements to the school choice matching process continue to be suggested[11]. As part of Boston's school assignment reform process, there has been an open call for additional proposals, at least one of which is derived from previous theoretical work[12].

Given Boston's potential move away from a 3 zone plan to a larger number of zones (with a greater emphasis on proximity to choices), the experience of other communities also informed our analysis. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District ("CMS") moved from a race-based busing system to a choice-base system with a guaranteed local placement option. Research on CMS found that many parents had a strong preference for academic quality (even at the expense of proximity). They also found two cohorts of parents – the Þrst was highly responsive to quality measures and responded to quality improvements with higher demand for higher performing schools; the second was less responsive to academic quality and sought out proximity (resulting in greater placement at lower performing schools[13]. Other analysis of the impact of CMS' move Þnds that it increased racial inequality in achievement, attainment, and crime. However, attempts by CMS to mitigate some of these impacts through preferential resource allocation were partially effective for achievement and attainment, although not for crime[14].

In Boston, the proposed reform plans have already been analyzed by several institutions. A team from the Harvard Graduate School of Education found that the reform plans proposed by the BPS would decrease access to high quality schools for many students[15]. Another analysis which piggybacked on the Harvard GSE's formulation of school quality (MCAS scores, demand level and DESE designation) but, crucially, looked at access to both medium and high quality schools had slightly different Þndings. The Metropolitan Area Planning Council's report had more complex Þndings. It found that many students are already bused long distances for low quality schools and that certain reform conÞgurations might improve access to medium and high quality schools for certain minority and low income students[16].

In response to this input and comments in multiple public forums, the EAC went through several iterations of proposed plans. One participant in the process, MIT graduate student Peng Shi, reÞned his submission, resulting in the development of two of the three assignment plans under Þnal consideration including "Home-Based A" which was ultimately adopted. Shi and Parag Pathak, produced an analysis of the impact of the Þnal three plans under consideration[17], modeling each plan's impact on access.

IV: Methodology and Data

Data was drawn from two primary sources. As part of the 2012 school assignment reform process, the Boston Public Schools placed data on its website[18], including parent demand choices and achievement level by school. This data on parent demand was drawn from Round 1 for School Year 2012-2013. Student characteristic data is for School Year 2011-2012. School performance and descriptive data, including MCAS results, are from School 2010-2011.

The other primary source of school data was a data file provided by the Massachusetts School Building Authority. These file is an expanded version of the data provided in its 2010 Needs Survey[19]. We supplemented this information with tract level data from the 2010 Census. The Census data enabled us to look at the impact of proximity to families of different types on school preference.

We created a composite ranking to determine the most highly demanded schools by giving 1 point for every time a school was chosen first by a family, 2/3 of a point if it was a second choice, and 1/3 of a point if it was a third choice. The points for each school were summed to provide a single numerical value to account for demand level.

Our goal is to measure school popularity holding the level of nearby families constant, to correct for the tendency of people to select close schools. We therefore control for several measures of demand within one mile of the school (measured using 2010 American Community Survey Census data): the number of families with children under 19, the share of families with children of relevant ages, and the share of the population that is a college graduate. We include the last variable as a control for local demand, because better educated adults may be more involved with the assignment system and more focused on applying.

All regressions control for demand with a K1 indicator (for the kindergarten regression), a K-8 school indicator (for the kindergarten and sixth grade regression), school zone indicator, share of population with a college degree within one mile of the school, share of population in a certain age bracket within one mile of the school (ages 5-9 for the kindergarten regression, age 10-14 for the sixth grade regression, and age 15-19 for the ninth grade regression), and the log of number of families with children 189 and younger within a mile of the school. Dummy variable are also used to control for Special Education, English Language Learning, and Advanced Work Class when a regression includes all programs.

It should be noted that the conclusions of this paper are necessarily limited by the data available. Care should be taken to note the difference between “high demand” and “high quality”, only the former is being analyzed here. In addition, MCAS success is being used as an indicator of academic performance but its limitations in this role should also be considered.

This demand level was treated as the dependent variable and subjected to regression analysis against a series of independent variables.

Our basic approach is to look at the correlates of parental choice. Our core outcome variable is the number of families who rank the school as one of their three top choices in kindergarten, sixth grade and ninth grade. These are the three years where families typically choose schools. In the case of kindergarten, we combine K1 and K2, both of which have substantial numbers of applicants, and omit K0, which is far smaller. We have not found significantly different results for the two kindergarten years, but we do include a control variable for the K1 year.

Our decision to focus on the top three choices is, in a sense, fairly arbitrary, but we have replicated our work with different choice cutoffs and found essentially identical results.

In all of our work, we use multivariate regressions which measure the correlation between two variables, holding other variables constant. There is a natural tendency to interpret regressions causally, but that inclination should be checked. In many cases, the observed correlation may reflect omitted characteristics that are actually driving the relationship. For example, if we estimate the connection between parental

the number of applicants. Small programs, at least in general education, are typically as likely to attract applicants as larger programs. If parents were trying to game the system, they might well apply more assiduously to larger programs, but they are not. This does not imply that parents are reporting their true preferences, but it is a piece of evidence suggesting that these choices are not primarily strategic.

V: Findings

Copious anecdotal evidence exists to support a variety of preferences for parents selecting schools for their children. These include proximity to home, academic characteristics, school/building features, program variety ("specials") and grades offered. Here we attempt to add to the discussion by statistically examining these anecdotal preferences to determine their correlation with actual parental choice.

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[redacted]

Our goal was to assess popularity controlling for the level of local demand. Many parents want schools that are close as discussed previously. To correct for the level of local demand, we use three Census based variables based on tracts within one mile of the school. We control for the share of the population that is in the relevant age group. For kindergartens, that means the share of families with children aged between Þve and nine. For grade 6, we include the share of families with children aged between 10 and 14. For grade 9, we include families with children aged between 15 and 19. We could have zeroed in on children aged a single year, but that would tend to increase measurement error and when we tried that approach it yielded less statistically signiÞcant results.

We also control for the logarithm of the number of families with children under the age of 19 (children aged 18 and under). This is meant to capture the overall population density nearby. We take logarithms to smooth this variable and avoid the impact of extremes. We also control for the share of adults within a mile that have a college degree. College education may be a proxy for engagement with the education process and as such it can be seen as another measure of demand. Of course, it may also proxy for the quality of the school because of the preference given to walk-zone children. For that reason, we compare the coefÞcient on this variable with and without controlling for test scores.

Our regressions include a number of other basic controls. For kindergarten and sixth grade, we also control for the school's zone and whether the school is citywide. We combine data for K1 and K2 programs, but control for whether the program is K1. In a few cases, there are multiple general education programs at a single school. In that case, we have included all of the observations but corrected the standard errors to reßect the fact that two programs at the same school are not independent observations. While we have 147 programs in our sample, we only have 68 separate schools. We address this by clustering our data by school, a well-established statistical procedure that will typically tend to make results less statistically signiÞcant. For kindergarten and sixth grade, we control for whether the school is a K-8 school.

The Þrst regression in Table 1 shows our Þrst set of results for general education kindergarten programs. There is more demand in K1 than in K2, which is

Variables	(1) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed only)	(2) .407				

unsurprising given the desirability of getting children in early. There is also more demand for K-8 programs, which may reßect the desire to ensure that a child can stay at the same school through high school. We see no effect of different zones, which is not surprising if we believe that the zones are drawn in part to ensure an even match between the number

of students and the number of school slots. Citywide schools are more popular, receiving an extra 46 choice points on average in kindergarten.

The neighborhood characteristics all have the expected sign. As the share of families with a child between 5 and 9 within the walk zone increase by 5 percent (about one standard deviation), the number of choice points for the school increases by 64. This is an extremely large effect that suggests the important of controlling for this variable.

Actual Versus Predicted Popularity

Using this regression, we can produce a list of kindergarten programs by popularity controlling for all local neighborhood characteristics.This list take the number of points received by a program and subtracts the amount predicted by its local neighborhood characteristics. Table 2 shows the top and bottom ten programs, by popularity, in Boston. Murphy K-8 is the most popular school in this ranking followed by Quincy Elementary. Murphy is the most popular program overall as well, but Quincy has been lifted up by our procedure. Several of the schools in the bottom ten look worse because we have controlled for local demand.

Table 2

The impact of nearby college graduates is similarly signiÞcant statistically, but the coefÞcient is much smaller. As the share of adults with a college degree increases by four percentage points (about one standard deviation), nearby schools typically receive an extra 6.8 choice points. The impact of the number of families is not statistically signiÞcant, but it is positive. On average, as the number of families increases by .33 (about one-third), the school receives an extra Þve choice points. We will continue to control for these variables in all of our speciÞcations.

The second regression repeats this procedure including all of the kindergarten programs, including special education and English language learning. We control

for the type of program (general education versus English language versus special education) and continue to cluster our standard errors at the school level to avoid

worth stressing that there are only 24 options for general education high schools, which somewhat limits our ability to draw inferences from the data.

One of the most frequently stated preferences[20] by parents, particularly those from certain neighborhoods, was access to nearby schools, commonly termed ‘neighborhood schools’. The potential for the lottery process to produce results contrary to this preference was demonstrated, in anecdotal fashion, by coverage of a modestly-sized single street in Boston where the nineteen school-age residents attended 15 different schools[21].

As the BPS lottery system contains a preference[22] for walk zone students (described above), it is not surprising a strong linear relationship exists between demand, assignment, and proximity. However, emerging research suggests that walk zone preference may have a minimal effect, contrary to public perception suggesting that proximity is a stronger preference on the part of parents that initially expected[23]. Figure 2 show that those students receiving their first choice had an average distance to school of 1.58 miles. Those receiving their second choice were 1.88 miles away on average. Third choice assignees were 2.04 miles away and fourth choice assignees were 2.24 miles away.

Figure 2: Average Distance to School by Choice



Table 3 begins our analysis of the school level correlates of parental demand for schools. In the first two regressions, we look at the correlation between the share of parents who rank the kindergarten in their top three choices and the share of students in the school that score either advanced or proficient on the MCAS tests for Math and English respectively. We cannot tell if these test score differences reflect the educational impact of the school, or just the selection of more academically prepared students into different programs. In the first four regressions, we look only at general education programs.

Table 3

The Þnal regression in the table includes all programs and Þnds, on average, signiÞcantly smaller effects. However, the mean is also much smaller (43 as opposed to 179), so the effect remains quite larger relative to the mean. We again Þnd that when we include both math and English test scores, math scores are signiÞcant while English scores are not.

The pattern is quite similar at the kindergarten and grade 9 level: test scores really effect parental choice. The interpretation of these results depends, partially, on one's intellectual starting point. If one thought that rational parents would singlemindedly seek the highest performing schools, then the relatively modest ability of test scores to explain preferences could be a point against parental choice. If one expected many other things to matter, as well as the vicissitudes of the tastes of individual families, then these strong effects should make you more conÞdent about trusting parents to choose their schools.

Table 4

Variables	(1) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed)	(2) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed)	(3) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed)	(4) Choice Points Kindergarten (Gen Ed with subprograms combined	(5) Choice Points Grade 6 (Gen Ed)	(6) Choice Points Grade 6 (Gen Ed)	(7) Choice Points Grade 9 (Gen Ed)	(8) Choice Points Grade 9 (Gen Ed)	(9) Choice Points Grade 9 (Gen Ed)	(10) Choice Points Grade 9 (All programs)
MATH Student Growth Percentage	-0.0725 (0.209)		-0.315 (0.207)	0.0474 (0.834)	0.00359 (0.594)		3.279* (1.614)		2.475 (1.943)	0.858* (0.483)
ELA Student Growth Percentage		0.398 (0.243)	0.602** (0.254)	1.157 (1.060)		0.569 (1.232)		3.632*** (1.257)	2.633 (1.871)	0.855* (0.452)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-219.1* (114.2)	-240.7** (116.1)	-242.2** (114.2)	-555.6** (259.8)	-334.2 (261.3)	-379.0 (278.0)	122.7 (501.6)	-60.56 (422.3)	72.51 (489.9)	55.41 (116.1)
Observations	141	141	141	66	38	38	23	23	23	114
R-squared	0.287	0.299	0.308	0.293	0.294	0.298	0.592	0.587	0.624	0.627

Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard Errors are Clustered at the School Level
See Table 1 for Controls.

Given the correlation between test scores and popularity, we examined another dimension of test scores, namely the growth percentage of both math and English scores, a measure that gauges progress in test score improvement over time relative to schools across Massachusetts, in Table 4. In Kindergarten, English student growth percentage was associated with higher rankings. In High School, stronger performance in student growth percentages was also associated with higher ranking. In Grade 6 no association was observed and no grade showed any effect of performance on student growth percentage. This may be due to the fact that absolute test score performance is relatively easy to observe, while student growth percentage improvements are more difÞcult to observe.

In regressions one through four, we examine the association between improvement

In our next two tables we turn towards other school characteristics that could potentially influence parental choice. Table 5 focuses on school characteristics; Table 6 examines program availability. In principle, evidence on the influence that these variables have on parental choice should provide significant information about the value parents place on these attributes, which in turn should help guide investment decision by the Boston Public Schools. Yet there are several reasons why we should be wary about drawing conclusions from any evidence of this kind.

Table 5

Variables	(1) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(2) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(3) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(4) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(5) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(6) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(7) Choice Points K1 and K2(All Pro-grams)	(8) Choice Points Grade 6 (Gen Ed Only)	(9) Choice Points Grade 6 (All Pro-grams)	(10) Choice Points Grade 9 (Gen Ed Only)	(11) Choice Points Grade 9 (All programs)
GSF/Student	0.0729 (0.0618)					0.0509 (0.0655)	0.0598 (0.0499)	0.0210 (0.0782)	0.0124 (0.0375)	-0.0479* (0.0269)	-0.0423** (0.0185)
Building Condition Rating		2.652 (5.507)				3.318 (5.523)	1.873 (4.100)	10.97 (17.14)	13.80* (7.984)	10.39 (28.13)	1.583 (4.685)
Has Gym			8.806 (7.448)			4.670 (7.812)	0.688 (5.787)	-45.77 (34.81)	-18.24 (14.29)	89.18 (53.80)	34.90** (15.72)

represents one standard deviation in this sample, is associated with about three more choice points. Even if this underestimates the true impact of gross square footage, the coefficient certainly suggests that parents aren't valuing physical space a great deal.

The potential worry with this coefficient is that schools with more square footage may have other problems. It is, for example, typically true that kindergartens with more space have lower test scores on average, for whatever reason. Of course, we control for math test scores but if other omitted characteristics are correlated with

Table 6

Variables	(1) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(2) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(3) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(4) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(5) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)	(6) Choice Points K1 and K2(All Pro-grams)	(7) Choice Points Grade 6 (Gen Ed Only)	(8) Choice Points Grade 6 (All Pro-grams)	(9) Choice Points Grade 9 (Gen Ed Only)	(10) Choice Points Grade 9 (All programs)
No Art Indicator	-7.449 (7.349)				-5.778 (7.136)	-1.896 (5.384)	15.45 (29.10)	14.67 (15.05)	-74.52 (46.20)	-1.736 (15.49)
No Music Indicator		-6.156 (6.870)								

In the seventh and eighth regressions, we turn to sixth grade results. In these regressions, there is little that is signiÞcant, but there are meaningfully large negative coefÞcients for the absence of science lab, suggesting that science labs may actually be important in this range. There is a comparable result for absence of music—a negative coefÞcient with a reasonably large magnitude that is only marginally signiÞcant.

Table 7

Variables	(1) Choice Points K1 and K2 (Gen Ed Only)							

Our seventh table gives results looking at the racial characteristics of the neighborhood nearby. This attempts to quantify the extent to which moving towards more neighborhood-based schools will give more access to families from particular races. The first regression looks at the correlation between choice points and the share of families within one mile of the score that are white, Asian and African-American. Hispanic and other groups are the omitted category.

The first regression shows that schools near white and black families are both more popular. The effects of proximity to either group are strong and positive and similar in magnitude. Proximity to Asian parents is an even stronger predictor of the school's popularity. As the share of the population within a mile of the school that is Asian increases by ten percent, the number of choice points increases by 42. This effect may reflect the perceived popularity of the school or it may reflect the tendency of members of these groups to apply more to neighborhood schools.

The second regression shows that these effects remain, although their magnitudes are decreased, when we control for the math scores in the school. The Asian effect drops the most dramatically. Although the race effects do get somewhat smaller, they remain statistically significant and similar in magnitude. The third regression shows that these effects remain when we consider all kindergarten programs, not just general education.

Regression four and five look at grade six. In this case, all three racial coefficients remain positive, but the results are generally not significant. Regressions six, seven and eight look at results for high schools. In this case, the coefficients are typically negative, but they are not statistically distinct from zero.

Our results suggest that for kindergarteners, school popularity is significantly higher in areas that are close to white, black and Asian families. These results persist even when we control for test scores, so this is not just reflecting better academics in these areas. Still, they do suggest that restricting choice to near neighborhoods may particularly restrict the ability of Hispanics to get into more popular schools. We now turn to other correlates of school popularity.

In Table 8, we look at popularity across neighborhood. Our goal here is to see whether some neighborhoods are particularly likely to contain popular schools, even controlling for neighborhood characteristics. The concentration of larger numbers of popular schools in particular neighborhoods helps inform us about which areas will be winners and losers if there is a movement towards more neighborhood-based schooling.

The first regression in Table 8 includes our core controls and a series of neighborhood dummies. The omitted neighborhood is Charlestown so the neighborhood effects should be thought of as the added effect of being in that neighborhood relative to Charlestown. Three neighborhoods have large negative coefficients: Allston-Brighton, East Boston and Roxbury. The impact of East Boston may largely reflect that area's geographic isolation, which may not be fully captured by our local neighborhood controls. The impact of Roxbury is somewhat weaker than the other two neighborhoods but not statistically significant. Still, the -33 coefficient is almost equal to a full standard deviation of the choice variable, so it is a quite large effect even if it is statistically imprecise.

West Roxbury is the only neighborhood with a statistically distinct positive effect. This effect is almost two standard deviations and it reßects the extreme popularity of several West Roxbury schools. There are also large effects in North and South Dorchester, and Mattapan, although these effects are not statistically signiÞcant. It is hard not to conclude that neighborhood-based schools would mean that some neighborhoods would gain increased access to dramatically more popular schools,

We Þrst looked at whether popular schools were particularly prone to be located in different neighborhoods of Boston controlling for these other neighborhood characteristic. We found that West Roxbury was well endowed with popular schools, while Allston-Brighton, Roxbury and East Boston were not. We found that areas with more white, black and Asian households (as a percentage of the total) generally had more popular schools. Hispanic areas had fewer popular schools. These results suggest that any move towards more neighborhood schools must guard against signiÞcant redistribution of opportunity across neighborhoods and demographic groups.

We then turned to the school-level correlates of popularity. Above all, math test scores correlate strongly with school popularity for kindergarten and high schools. The correlation is not perfect, implying either that parents care about more than test scores or that parents are not well-informed about this speciÞc attribute, but it is still reasonably high.

Other school attributes valued by parents were the presence of K1 offerings, the K-8 structure and citywide eligibility.

By contrast, there are few other meaningful correlations with other school attributes. In general physical characteristics were not strongly correlated with school popularity, except for cleanliness, and these results were often precise enough to rule out any large positive effects. School curricular activities, conversely, did not have statistically dramatic effects, but we cannot rule out big impacts of art and music on school popularity.

Nonetheless, these school attribute effects should make us doubt whether there are any ready substitutes for academic quality, as measured by test scores. We should not think that we can make families whole by giving them larger classrooms or wireless availability, in exchange for lower test scores. Parents favor academic quality and that should give us somewhat more conÞdence in relying on parental choice in school assignment.

Endnotes

[1]Walk Zones are 1 mile for elementary schools, 1.5 miles for middle schools and 2 miles for high schools.

[2] The concept of the walk zone is bit less static than it appears. The 1 mile radius

[16] Reardon, Tim, “Comparative Analysis of Boston Public School Proposed Assignment Plans”, Metropolitan Area Planning Council, October 12, 2012.

[17] Pathak, Parag, and Shi, Peng. January 2013, “Simulating Alternative School Choice Options in Boston – Main Report”. MIT School Effectiveness and Inequality Initiative.

[18] http://bostonschoolchoice.org/raw-data/, last accessed on October 9, 2012.

[19] http://www.massschoolbuildings.org/sites/default/Þles/edit-contentÞle/Our%20Programs/2010_Needs_Survey_Report_29April2011.pdf, last accessed on October 9, 2012

[20] All Statements on Preferences drawn from: Boston Public Schools: Improving School Choice, http://www.Þ

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